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Abstract
This paper explores the link between upstream input pricing and downstream strategic delegation
decisions. It complements earlier contributions by studying how environmental emissions and tax
payments alter the incentives business owners have to divert their managers from prot maxi-
mization in favor of sales revenue generation. Two scenarios are compared depending on whether
the upstream supplier precommits to a xed input price or adopts a exible price strategy. Corre-
sponding Subgame-Perfect Nash-Equilibria are characterized and elements of comparative statics
analysis are presented. The analysis conrms that previous results  showing that a price pre-
commitment makes the upstream supplier better o and downstream rms worse o  carry over
to situations in which production generates pollution.
Keywords: precommitment, externality, delegation, vertical relations, managerial incentives
1 Introduction
This chapter bridges two elds of research in which Georges Zaccour has been active:
the analysis of vertical relations and environmental and resource economics. The former
studies relations between rms that intervene successively along the value chain whereas
the latter deals with the relations between the economy and the environment. We can
trace back his interest for vertical relations to his early contributions on the analysis of
energy markets (Zaccour, 1983, 1987; Breton et al., 1990). Today this interest is mainly
manifested in his work on marketing channels.1 But, it also comes up tangentially in a va-
riety of contributions ranging from environmental economics  where sustainable tourism
development may require tourism destinations to delegate expenditures in environmental
remediation to a regional authority (Claude & Zaccour, 2009)  to institutional economics
 where good institutions are produced by the strategic precommitment of civil society
to ght corruption (Ngendakuriyo & Zaccour, 2013).
Strategies of delegation and precommitment are at the heart of the literature on strate-
gic delegation to which this chapter contributes.2 Starting with Vickers (1985), Fershtman
∗We would like to thanks the two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions. This
work was supported by the ANR GREEN-Econ research project (ANR-16-CE03-0005).
1 See Jorgensen & Zaccour (2004) and the references therein.
2 For literature surveys, see Lambertini (2017), Kopel & Pezzino (2018) and Sengul et al. (2012).
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& Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), this literature has examined the incentives owners have
to delegate production decisions. By hiring a manager, the owner of a rm can credibly
commit to pursue a goal that diers from maximizing prot. The managerial compen-
sation contract will then be designed to convey the appropriate managerial incentives
to guide the manager in his day-to-day decisions. Its terms will provide for a variable
target-based bonus that rewards the manager's performance in achieving some alterna-
tive goal to (pure) prot maximization. This variable part may be based on any one or
a combination of the following criteria : prot, sales volume or revenue, market share,
and corporate social responsibilityor environmental objectives. Since rational managers
respond to nancial incentives conveyed by the variable part of their remuneration, they
will be encouraged to deviate from prot maximization.
As is well known, by choosing to reward sales revenue rather than prot, the owner
encourages the manager to adopt a more aggressive market behavior. Namely, the man-
agerial rm will produce more (for any level of production of its competitors) than a
prot-maximizing owner-managed rm. Financial disclosure rules usually ensure that the
incentives embedded in managerial compensation contracts are common knowledge.3 Any
change in the performance criteria presiding over managerial compensation will then af-
fect the expectations of competing rms. This opens the door to a strategic manipulation
of compensation contracts: each owner attempting to alter the expectations of rival rms
to its own advantage.
But deviating from prot maximization is only protable when the deviation is unilateral.
And, since all owners face similar incentives to deviate, widespread deviations are to
be expected and excessive output supply will result into lower prots for all. Hence,
the opportunity to strategically delegate day-to-day production decisions to a manager
closes as a trap on rm owners who actually nd themselves confronted with a Prisoner's
Dilemma.
Strategic delegation provides a much needed rationale for observed deviations from prot
maximization. This rationale, however, assumes that rms are vertically integrated and
produce their own inputs. When this assumption is relaxed, the vertical externality
linked to input pricing appears to have a disciplining role on downstream rms' behavior.
If duopolists buy in inputs from a common monopolist supplier, Park (2002) shows that
strategic delegation becomes unprotable for business owners. Wang & Wang (2010)
reach the same conclusion by assuming that managerial incentive contract rewards a
combination of prot and market share (rather than prot and sale revenues). On the
contrary, Liao (2008; 2010) shows that strategic delegation retains its strategic value
if the input supplier precommits to a xed input price. This conclusion is backed by
Wang (2015), who proves it true when compensation contracts reward the manager's
performance relative to peers.4 Finally, Claude (2018) shows that Park (2002)'s main
results no longer holds if we consider a downstream market consisting of more than two
 but a nite number of  rms.
This paper re-examines the link between vertical externalities and strategic delegation
decisions. We consider an extended version of Park (2002)'s model in which downstream
rms generate pollution emissions when they process the intermediate product into a nal
good. Specically, we assume that the emission of a rm, per unit of output produced, is
inversely related to that rm's productivity in processing inputs. Since pollution emissions
are assumed to be taxed, downstream rms have an incentive to internalize them, at least
in part.
Two papers have investigated the consequences of strategic delegation for environmental
policy-making. In a Cournot duopoly with homogeneous goods and pollution emissions,
3 See, Vural (2018) for the example of the ball bearing compagny SKF
4 This form of strategic delegation was rst studied by Fumas (1992) and Miller & Pazgal (2002)
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Barcena-Ruiz & Garzon (2002) nd that strategic delegation is protable. At the equi-
librium, managerial rms produce and emit more than prot-maximizing owner-managed
rms. Consequently, the optimal environmental tax is higher than that required to reg-
ulate a standard Cournot market. Pal (2012) generalizes this result to dierentiated
industries. However, none of these papers has investigated how factor market imperfec-
tions alter managerial incentives in downstream markets, which is the main purpose of
our paper. Since our model encompasses those of Park (2002) and Claude (2018), we
check the robustness of their results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 solves the
managerial sub-game. Sections 4 and 5 characterize the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) depending on whether the upstream monopolist precommits to a price. SPNE
outcomes are compared in Section 6. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
We extend the model of Park (2002) to account for the existence of pollution (or waste).
Consider a vertical market structure with upstream monopoly and downstream quantity
competition. The single upstream monopolist (indexed by up) produces at no cost a
homogeneous input x that it sells at a non-discriminatory price k>0. Let xi denote
the input consumption of rm i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and X =
∑n
i=1 xi the aggregate input
demand. The upstream supplier's prot function is simply piup = kX.
Downstream rms rely on the same technology to turn the intermediate product x into
a nal good y. Let yi denote the output of Firm i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and Y =
∑n
i=1 yi the
aggregate downstream output. Firm i's production function is yi = ε xi, where ε ∈ (0, 1]
is a parameter measuring Firm i's productivity.
Pollution emissions come as a by-product of production. More precisely, they are inversely
related to Firm i's productivity and given by ei = (1− ε)xi.5 We assume that the
government levies a tax on pollution emissions at a rate τ ≥ 0. Obviously, the more
inecient the rm is (the lower the value of ε), the higher is the quantity of pollution
emitted for each unit of the nal good y produced and the higher is the rm's tax bill for a
given level of output. Conversely, if ε is assumed equal to 1 then the rm no longer emits
pollution and its environmental tax bill is zero. Without loss of generality, we assume that
downstream rms face no other production cost than that associated with input purchase.
Demand for the nal good y is represented by the inverse demand function P (Y ) = a−bY
with a, b > 0. Under the above assumptions, Firm i's prot function is given by
pii = P (Y )yi − kxi − (1− ε)τxi. (1)
Using the production function, the above can be expressed in terms of y only:
pii = P (Y )yi −A (k, τ, ε) yi, where A (k, τ, ε) = k + τ
ε
− τ, (2)
denotes rm i's eective marginal cost of production; namely, the sum of the rm's input
expenditure (k/ε) and environmental tax bill (τ (1− ε) /ε). Observe that ∂A/∂ε < 0,
5 We assume that the more ecient the rm is, the less input is used per unit of output and thus
the lower the level of waste or emission generated. This assumption conforms to empirical ndings by
Shadbegian & Gray (2003). Examining the determinants of environmental performance at paper mills,
they found that high productivity plants pollute less. More precisely, a 10% higher productivity level is
associated with a 2.5% lower emission per unit of output. Furthermore, they found that unexpectedly high
productivity levels are associated with unexpectedly low levels of emissions per unit of output. Shadbegian
& Gray (2003) advance two main explanations for their results. On the one hand, newer production plants
may be more ecient in production but also designed so as to reduce pollution emissions or waste. On the
other hand, older, more inecient, rms may face less regulatory pressure and retrotting their facilities
may be extremely dicult so that abatement possibilities are reduced.
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∂A/∂τ > 0 and ∂A/∂k > 0, which is in accordance with intuition. Indeed, an increase
in the price of factors (τ for emissions, and k for the intermediate product) leads to a
corresponding increase in marginal cost, whereas an increase in the productivity parameter
ε translates into a reduced (eective) marginal cost.
The owners of downstream rms may hire managers to run their rms on their behalf. The
decision to hire a manager leads to the so-called divorce between ownership and control.
Indeed, when management and control functions are divorced, agency problems arise if the
manager's interests diverge from those of the owner (Sengul et al., 2012). In the remainder
of this paper, we assume that all agency problems have been resolved6 to focus our
attention on the strategic value of delegation decisions. Following Vickers (1985), Sklivas
(1987) and Fershtman & Judd (1987), we assume that owners hire managers in order to
credibly commit their businesses to objectives that dier from prot maximization. Here,
we assume that this objective is the maximization of a weighted sum of prots and sales
revenue; i.e.,
Fi = αipii + (1− αi) [P (Y )yi] . (3)
The prot weight αi is chosen strategically by the owner of rm i in order to manip-
ulate the anticipations of rival rms to its own advantage (i.e., in a protable way).
The corresponding departure from prot maximization is credible since the inclusion of
a target-based bonus in managerial compensation contracts ensures that appropriate in-
centives are conveyed to managers.7 Depending on the value selected for αi, owners can
encourage a wide range of behaviors. To see this, let us rewrite Equation (3) as:
Fi = P (Y ) yi − αiA (k, τ, ε) yi. (4)
Then the performance measure has straightforward interpretation. By choosing αi = 1,
rm owners encourage pure prot maximization. However, if αi is set lower than one,
they direct their managers to pursue revenue generation at the expense of prots and
if αi is set greater than one they direct their managers to pursue cost minimization at
the expense of prot generation. We let α⃗ = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) denote the prole of prot
weights chosen by downstream owners.
We consider two scenarios depending on whether the upstream monopolist is able to
precommit to a xed input price. In the rst scenario, we assume that price is dicult
to change and communicate to customers. In this case, price commitments are credible.
The order of moves is then as follows. The upstream monopolist moves rst and sets
the input price. After observing this price, downstream owners design their managerial
compensation contracts simultaneously and independently. Obviously, the latter simply
means setting the value of the prot weight αi. At the last stage of the game, managers
compete in quantities so as to maximize their compensation, taking into account their
target-based bonus and the input price.
6 After delegation, the manager may not act in the owner's interest and engage in opportunistic prac-
tices and other self-serving behaviors. Managerial opportunism arises from two main sources (Eisenhardt,
1989) : (a) the objectives of the owner and the manager may conict and (b) the owner may not be able
to observe the behavior of the manager. The rst is of little relevance in our context. Indeed, we assume
that the manager is oered a performance-based bonus which reduces conicts of interests and ensures
that the manager will adhere to the owner's supply strategy. However, appropriate monitoring and gover-
nance mechanisms should be put in place in order to treat the second source of managerial opportunism.
Indeed, unobservable behaviors may result in expropriation of the company funds (Shleifer & Vishny,
1997). Common examples include the excessive consumption of perquisites such as luxurious oces and
company jets. More broadly, managerial discretion may result in the allocation of company funds to the
pursuit of pet projects or that of an irrational expansion of the rm.
7 Consider a two-parts compensation contract wi = w
F
i + w
V
i Fi where w
F
i ≥ 0 denotes the base
salary and wVi > 0 denotes the bonus rate that rewards performance as measured by Fi. Given this
compensation contract, it is equivalent for manager i to maximize the compensation wi or the target Fi.
For more on this point see Kopel & Pezzino (2018).
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Scenario 1: Price precommitment
Scenario 2: Flexible pricing mechanism
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
The Upstream Firm
sets k
Each Manager i
sets yi
Each Owner i
chooses αi
Time
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Each Owner i
chooses αi
The Upstream Firm
sets k
Each Manager i
sets yi
Time
Fig. 1: Timing of the games: precommitment vs. exible pricing
In the second scenario, we assume that prices are easy to change and communicate and the
upstream monopolist is unable (or unwilling) to make a price precommitment. Without
price commitment the upstream monopolist retains the opportunity to adjust the input
price to changes in the behavior of downstream rms. The order of moves is then as
follows. In the rst stage of the game, Firm owners simultaneously and independently
choose the compensation contracts that will be oered to hired managers (i.e., they set
αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n) . In the second stage, when the prole of managerial incentives α⃗ is
known and common knowledge, the upstream monopolist sets the input price k. Then,
in the last stage, managers compete in quantities so as to maximize their compensation
taking into account their target-based bonuses and the input price.
The dierence between the timing of moves in the above two scenarios is illustrated in
Figure 1. Both three stage games are solved by backward induction. Since the last stage
is common to both games, it will be analyzed separately in the next section.
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. We assume that the eciency of rms is suciently high, 1 ≥ ε > τa+τ ,
(or the price of energy is suciently low, aε(1−ε) > τ > 0) to ensure that all rms are active
at the equilibrium.
3 The managerial subgame
At stage 3, given α⃗ and k, each manager i simultaneously and independently chooses
a quantity yi so as to maximize Fi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Assuming an interior solution, the
resulting system of rst-order conditions is
P (Y ) + P ′(Y )yi = αiA (k, τ, ε) , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (5)
Obviously, these conditions repeat the standard provision that marginal revenue must
equal the marginal cost of production. However, when the manager strikes the balance
between marginal costs and revenue, he does not consider the rm's actual marginal cost
of production A (k, τ, ε), but its depreciated (or inated) value by the weight factor αi.
By solving the i-th equation in (5) for yi we obtain:
yi =
αiA (k, τ, ε)− P (Y )
P ′(Y )
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (6)
If αi < 1, observe that the manager i is induced to produce more than a prot-maximizing
rm owner (for each output choice of its competitors). By choosing prot weights that
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are lower than one, owners induce their managers to be more aggressive on the output
market.
Summing Equations (6) over i results in:
Y =
A (k, τ, ε)
∑n
i=1 αi
P ′(Y )
− n P (Y )
P ′(Y )
, (7)
or, equivalently,
Y P ′(Y ) + nP (Y ) = A (k, τ, ε)
n∑
i=1
αi. (8)
This last equation implicitly denes the equilibrium industry output Y ⋆ as a function
of a weighted sum of the marginal costs of production incurred by the rms making
up the industry. This result repeats the observation by Bergstrom & Varian (1985a,b)
that Cournot-Nash quantities depend solely on the sum of the rms' characteristics and,
especially, are independent of how those characteristics are distributed. By substituting
the inverse demand function P (Y ) = a− bY into the xed-point Equation (8) and solving
for the equilibrium industry output level, we obtain:
Y ⋆ =
na−A(k,τ,ε)∑ni=1 αi
b(n+1) . (9)
Now, by plugging this quantity back into Firm i's (inclusive) reaction function (6), we
obtain:
y⋆i =
a+A(k,τ,ε)(
∑n
i=1 αi−(n+1)αi)
(n+1)b . (10)
The implied equilibrium price is:
P ⋆ := P (Y ⋆) =
a+A(k,τ,ε)
∑n
i=1 αi
(n+1) . (11)
4 Price precommitment
In this rst scenario, the upstream monopolist precommits to an input price k. So,
at the time when owners design their managers' compensation contracts, the pricing
policy of the upstream monopolist is known and common knowledge. The timing of the
game is depicted in Figure 1. At Stage 2, each owner simultaneously and independently
chooses the incentives to provide to management (i.e., the prot weight αi). At stage 1,
the upstream supplier sets the input price k. Now, we resume the backward induction
procedure starting with the design of managerial incentive contracts.
4.1 Choice of managerial incentive contracts
Each owner i sets the prot weight αi so as to maximize its prot taking the input price
k as given; i.e., owner i solves
max
αi
pii = [P (Y
⋆)−A (k, τ, ε)] y⋆i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (12)
Assuming an interior solution, we obtain the following system of n rst-order conditions
for prot maximization:
P ′(Y ⋆)
∂Y ⋆
∂αi
y⋆i +
∂y⋆i
∂αi
[P (Y ⋆)−A (k, τ, ε)] = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (13)
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The rst term on the left-hand side corresponds to a gain in sales revenue linked to the
price increase resulting from the reduction in total industry output. The second term
corresponds to a prot loss linked to the reduction in rm i's supply. Conditions (13)
indicate that managerial incentive contracts should be designed so as to balance these two
countervailing eects.
From Equations (9) and (10), we obtain (See Appendix A.1):
∂Y ⋆/∂αi = −A/ (b (n+ 1)) , ∂y⋆i /∂αi = −nA/ (b (n+ 1))) . (14)
Replacing in Equation (13), P (Y ), P ′(Y ), ∂Y /∂αi, ∂yi/∂αi and yi by their respective
expressions, after straightforward calculations, we obtain:
−(n− 1) (a+A∑ni=1 αi)− (n+ 1)A (αi − n) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (15)
Solving each of the above equations, we nd the expression of αi as a function of
∑n
i=1 αi:
αi = n− (n−1)(n+1)A (a+A
∑n
i=1 αi) , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (16)
Summing Equations (15) over i = 1, 2, . . . , n, results in
−(n− 1)na− (1 + n2)A∑ni=1 αi + n2 (n+ 1)A = 0, (17)
from which we extract the expression of the weighted sum of managerial incentives∑n
i=1 αi =
n((n+1)nA−(n−1)a)
(n2+1)A . (18)
Plugging this sum back into Equation (16) we nd:
αci = n− (n−1)(1+n2)A
(
a+ n2A
)
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (19)
Plugging αci back into Equations (9), (10) and (11) yields:
P (Y c) = a+n
2A
(1+n2) , Y
c= n
2(a−A)
b(1+n2) , y
c
i =
n(a−A)
b(1+n2) , pi
c
i =
n(a−A)2
b(1+n2)2
, (20)
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For the time being, let us assume that k is given and xed. Then, equilib-
rium values are presented in (20). As expected the solution is symmetric. Furthermore,
the solution is admissible (i.e., prices and quantities are strictly positive) provided that
a > A. From Equation (19), we obtain:
αci = α
c = 1− (n−1)(1+n2) (a/A− 1) , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (21)
Since admissibility implies a > A, it follows that ( aA − 1) > 0 and αc < 1. In other words,
equilibrium managerial compensation contracts provide that managers will be rewarded
for deviations from prot maximization that favor sales revenue generation. Now, observe
that A(k, τ, ε) > A (k, τ, 1) = k. Since ∂αc/∂A = a (n− 1) / (A2 (1 + n2)) > 0, we nd
that the equilibrium prot weight αc reaches a minimum when production generates no
pollution (i.e., when ε = 1):
αc|ε=1 = 1− (n−1)(1+n2) (a/k − 1) . (22)
This is the same expression as found by Claude (2018). Finally, still assuming that k is
given, we cannot exclude that αc might be negative for some parameter values. Indeed,
this could be the case for a > (n (n+ 1)A) / (n− 1). However, in the next section it is
shown that αc ranges in the interval [0, 1] when evaluated at the SPNE price kc.
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4.2 Monopoly pricing
At stage 1, the upstream supplier sets the input price k so as to maximize its prot; i.e.,
the monopolist solves
max
k
picup = kn (yc/ε) .
Assuming an interior solution exists, the rst-order condition for prot maximization is
yc + k
(
∂yc
∂k
)
= 0. (23)
Solving the above equation for k, after straightforward computations, we obtain the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the upstream monopolist precommits to a xed input price.
There exists a unique Subgame-Perfect Nash-Equilibrium. Equilibrium outcomes are,
respectively,
kc = aε−τ(1−ε)2 , α
c = 1− 2(n−1) kc(n2+1)(aε+τ(1−ε)) , yc = nk
c
b(n2+1)ε , (24)
P c =
aε(n2+2)+n2(τ(1− ε))
2(n2+1)ε , pi
c
up =
n2(kc)2
b(n2+1)ε2 , pi
c
i =
n(kc)2
b(n2+1)2ε2
. (25)
Assumption 1 ensures that all the quantities given in the above proposition are non
negative at the SPNE.
Remark 1. If ε = 1, we obtain the managerial incentive as in Claude (2018),
αc|ε=1 = 1− (n− 1)
(1 + n2)
,
and the same equilibrium values. Moreover, as ε tends to τ/ (a+ τ) the input price kc
tends to zero, αc tends to one and both upstream and downstream prots tends to zero.
We obtain the following comparative statics results:
∂kc
∂ε
> 0,
∂y
∂ε
c
> 0,
∂α
∂ε
c
< 0,
∂pici
∂ε
> 0,
∂picup
∂ε
> 0. (26)
A reduction in pollution emissions or, equivalently in our model, an increase in the pro-
ductivity of downstream rms, allows the upstream supplier to charge a higher input price
k. Also, it provides rm owners with incentives to assign a lower weight to prot maxi-
mization in managerial compensation contracts. This lower weight encourages managers
to adopt a more aggressive market behavior, which results in higher rm and industry
output levels. As a result, both upstream and downstream prots rise. The exact inverse
comparative static results obtains for changes in the tax rate τ . This should come as no
surprise given the inverse relationship between productivity and pollution emissions in
our model.
Finally, we have αc ∈ [0, 1], limn→+∞ αc = 1, and ∂αc∂n > 0, ∀n > 2. We conclude that
αc is monotonically increasing in n and converges to one as the number of downstream
rms become arbitrarily large. Indeed, as the number of rms increases, the downstream
market becomes more competitive implying that aggregate output rises and market price
falls. This in turn leads to a reduction in marginal revenue that must be compensated by
lower production volumes. Firm owners achieve the required production cut by assigning
a lower weight (1− α) to sales in managerial compensation schemes.
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5 Flexible pricing mechanism
We now turn to the second scenario in which the order of rms' moves is reversed. At
the time when the upstream monopolist sets the input price, it is assumed that the terms
of managerial compensation contracts are known and common knowledge. The timing of
the game is depicted in Figure 1. In stage 1, rm owners choose managerial incentives.
In stage 2, the upstream monopolist sets the input price. We now are in a position to
resume the backward induction procedure starting with the resolution of the monopolist
pricing problem.
5.1 Input pricing
In stage 2, the upstream monopolist sets the input price k so as to maximize its prot:
pi⋆up = k
∑n
i=1 x
⋆
i . Recall that y
⋆
i = εx
⋆
i so that x
⋆
i = y
⋆
i /ε
⋆. The decision problem of the
upstream monopolist then writes as
max
k
pi⋆up = k
n∑
i=1
(y⋆i /ε
⋆) .
Assuming an interior solution exists, the optimal input price solves
n∑
i=1
y⋆i + k
[
∂
∂k
(
n∑
i=1
y⋆i
)]
= 0. (27)
Replacing y⋆i by its value from (10) and solving for the optimal input price k gives:
kf =
naε− τ (1− ε)∑ni=1 αi
2
∑n
i=1 αi
. (28)
As we shall see below, Assumption 1 ensures that kf is positive for the SPNE value of αi.
Note that
∂kf
∂αi
= − naε
2 (
∑n
i=1 αi)
2 < 0. (29)
An increase in the weight downstream rms place on prots results in a decrease in the out-
put price. Alternatively, a greater sale orientation causes a reduction in the input price.
The economic intuition behind this result is straightforward. As the prot weight de-
creases, downstream managers are induced to behave more aggressively, producing more.
The increase in input demand then explains the increase in input price
5.2 Strategic delegation
In stage 1, each owner i simultaneously and independently sets the prot weight αi so as
to maximize its prot. In other words, each owner i solves the following problem
max
αi
pifi =
[
P (Y f )−A (kf , τ, ε)] yfi , i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
First-order conditions for prot maximization are:(
b∂Y
f
∂αi
+ 1ε
∂kf
∂αi
)(
P (Y f )− αfi Af
)
+
(
Af +
αfi
ε
∂kf
∂αi
+ b∂Y
f
∂αi
) (
P (Y f )−Af) = 0, (30)
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, it is shown in Appendix A.2 that
condition (30) reduces to
g (α) := ω0 + ω1α+ ω2α
2 + ω3α
3 = 0, (31)
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where
ω0 =a
2n2(n+ 1)ε2, ω2 =− nτ(1− ε)(n(n+ 1)(aε+ φ)− 2aε),
(32)
ω1 =− a
(
n2 − 1) ε((n+ 2)φ− nτ(1− ϵ)), ω3 =− n (n2 + 1) τ2(ε− 1)2, (33)
with φ = (aε− τ (1− ε)).
The following proposition provides a characterization of equilibrium managerial incentives:
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium managerial incentives). Suppose that the upstream monop-
olist uses a exible pricing mechanism. Then, there exists a unique symmetric SPNE
characterized as follows.
1. The equilibrium prot weight takes values on the interval (0, 1];
2. If production generates no pollution emission then it is given by αf
∣∣
ε=1
= n
2
(n−1)(n+2) ;
3. It is equal to oneimplying pure prot maximizationin two cases:
(a) if the downstream market consists in a duopoly and production generates no
pollution emission (n = 2, ε = 1) and,
(b) in the limit case where downstream rms are so inecient that they prefer to
be inactive at the equilibrium (ε = τ/(a+ τ)).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
We remark that Points 3(a) and (b) in Proposition 2 include as special cases results by
Claude (2018) which correspond to the model without pollution (ε = 1).
Assuming that αi = α
f for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and plugging (28) into Equations (9)-(11)
gives the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Equilibrium prices, quantities and prot levels are, respectively, given by
kf =
aε− τ (1− ε)αf
2αf
, P f =
aε(n+ 2) + nτ (1− ε)αf
2 (n+ 1) ε
, yf =
αfkf
b (n+ 1) ε
, (34)
pifup =
nαf
(
kf
)2
b (n+ 1) ε2
, pif =
αkf ((n+ 1)(aϵ+ τ(ϵ− 1))− kf (αfn+ n+ 1))
b(n+ 1)2ϵ2
. (35)
Under Assumption 1, it is straightforward to show that the prices kf and P f and the
quantities yf and Y f are strictly positive.
6 Comparing equilibrium outcomes
This section attempts to compare equilibrium outcomes depending on whether the up-
stream monopolist makes a price precommitment. A major diculty in doing this is due
to the complexity of the expression for αf . To begin with, we analyze how the decision to
precommit alters managerial incentives in the downstream market. We are able to state
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Comparison of managerial incentives). 1. The equilibrium prot weight
is lower when the upstream monopolist precommits to a xed input price; i.e.,
αc < αf .
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2. As the number of downstream rms becomes arbitrarily large and irrespective of the
pricing strategy adopted by the upstream monopolist, the equilibrium prot weight
converges to 1, implying that the behavior of managerial rms is eventually identical
to that of prot-maximizing owner-managed rms; i.e., limn→∞ αh = 1, h = c, f.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The above proposition extends previous results by Claude (2018), that were established
under the assumption that there is no pollution (ε = 1). It states that downstream owners
oer compensation schemes that favor sale orientation over prot maximization if the
upstream monopolist makes a price precommitment.
The intuition for this result can be traced back to the dierence in the timing of moves
between the two games that we consider. In the precommitment scenario, downstream
owners set managerial incentives when the input price is known and has become common
knowledge. Accordingly, in their decision-making process, they take the input price as
xed and given. By contrast, in the other scenario, the upstream monopolist adjusts the
input price to the observed degree of competition on the downstream market (as proxied
by managerial incentives). Then, downstream owners recognize that the price they pay for
the input x depends on the managerial incentives they give to their managers. Specically,
they know that a greater sale orientation (a lower value for αf ) results in higher total
downstream production, which, in turn, implies an increase in both input consumption
and input price. The implied surge in production costs reduces the extent to which rm
owners nd it protable to divert managers away from prot maximization; i.e. the value
of (1− αf ).
Finally, as the number of rms rises, the downstream market becomes increasingly compet-
itive so that the strategic value of delegation vanishes. Then, the behavior of managerial
rms converges to that of prot-maximizing owner-managed rms.
Next, we compare equilibrium input prices between the two scenarios. When the down-
stream market structure is a duopoly and no environmental externality exists, Liao (2008;
2010) showed that the upstream monopolist sets the same equilibrium price irrespective
of whether a price commitment was made. However, Claude (2018) proved that precom-
mitment results in a lower input price if more than two rms operate on the downstream
market. The following proposition extends this result to more general contexts in which
production is polluting the environment:
Proposition 5 (Comparison of input prices). If the downstream industry (i) is a duopoly
which generates no pollution emission or (ii) consists of innitely many rms, then the up-
stream monopolist sets the same price in both scenarios (commitment or no commitment).
Otherwise, precommitment results in a lower equilibrium input price.
Proof. From Equations (24) and (34), we obtain
kc − kf = −aε
(
1− αf)
2αf
≤ 0.
If n = 2 and ε = 1, then αf = 1 and kc = kf = a/2. Moreover, since αf tends to 1 as the
number of downstream rms becomes arbitrarily large, it follows that limn→∞ kc − kf =
0.
Turning to the comparison of production levels, we are able to prove the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 6 (Comparison of downstream production levels). Downstream managers are
encouraged to choose higher output levels if the upstream monopolist precommits to a
xed input price; i.e., yc−yf > 0. Consequently, precommitment results in more pollution.
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Proof. We have
∆y = yc − yf = aε (n− 1)−
(
n2
(
1− αf)+ n− αf) (1− ε) τ
2b (n+ 1) (n2 + 1) ε
. (36)
It is easy to see that yc − yf > 0 if and only if αf > α˜ where
α˜ = 1− (n−1)(aε−τ(1−ε))(n2+1)τ(1−ε) . (37)
From Proposition 4, recall that αf > αc. A little algebra shows that αc > α˜. Since
αf > α˜, it follows that yc > yf .
The intuition for this result can be understood by considering propositions 4 and 5 above.
The former shows that, in the precommitment scenario, rm owners design compensation
schemes so as to encourage a greater sale orientation (or, equivalently, a more aggressive
market behavior). Under the same assumption, the latter proves that the upstream mo-
nopolist sets a lower input price. This, in turn, implies that the nal good y becomes less
costly to produce. Then, the greater sale orientation combines with reduced production
costs to encourage greater production and emissions of pollutant.
Next, we turn to the comparison of downstream and upstream prot levels. In the ab-
sence of environmental externalities, Claude (2018) showed the upstream monopolist is
strictly better o when committing to a xed input price. The exact opposite holds for
downstream rms: if the upstream supplier engages in xed price contracts, they earn
lower prots.
These result might seem surprising at rst sight, since the upstream monopolist charges
a lower input price in the precommitment scenario. However, the basic intuition for this
result is simple. If the upstream monopolist adopts a exible pricing mechanism, down-
stream owners anticipate that a more aggressive market behavior will result in a higher
input price. Then, each owner provides his management with lower sales incentives. In
other words, each owner assigns a lower weight (1− α) to sales in managerial compensa-
tion schemes. This alleviates the problem of over-competition among rms arising from
strategic delegation.
However, by waiving the right to adjust the input price to changes in managerial in-
centives, the upstream monopolist place rm owners back into their initial prisoner's
dilemma situation. This strategic move creates the conditions for an overproduction that
is unprotable only for downstream owners. Indeed, precommitment makes the upstream
monopolist better o since the surge in input consumption implied by overproduction
more than compensates for the loss in revenue due to a reduced input price.
Unfortunately, if we relax the assumption that production causes no pollution, it becomes
dicult to sign the dierence between prots in the two scenarios for arbitrary parameter
values. With that said, we are still able to shed some light on how prots compare and
oer interesting insights on this issue. Let us recall that the admissible values of ε lie in
the range τ/(a + τ) < ε < 1. By evaluating upstream and downstream prots at both
extremities, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Comparison of prots). 1. If production causes no pollution, then the
upstream monopolist is better o committing to a xed input price:(
picup − pifup
) |ε=1 > 0.
However, the precommittment decision of the upstream supplier is detrimental to
downstream rms: (
pici − pifi
)∣∣∣
ε=1
< 0.
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2. For a suciently high level of emission per unit of the nal good produced (or a
suciently high environmental tax rate), downstream rms stop producing implying
zero-prots for all:
picup|ε= τa+τ = pifup|ε= τa+τ = 0 = pici |ε= τa+τ = pi
f
i |ε= τa+τ , i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof. By plugging the value of ε into the corresponding expressions.
We retrieve the same results as in Claude (2018). As a work around for the diculty
in signing dierences in upstream and downstream prots, we ran numerical simulations.
Despite extensive eorts, we found it impossible to nd even one numerical example that
is admissible and reverses the ranking between prots in Proposition 7. If production
generates few pollution emissions (ε is close to 1), numerical simulations conrm that
the upstream rm is better-o when committing to a xed input price (i.e., picup > pifup).
The opposite (i.e., picup < pifup) was obtained only for so low values of ε that downstream
rms produce nothing. Finally, we conrmed numerically that downstream rms makes
lower prots in the precommitment scenario. We conclude that previous results by Claude
(2018) are robust to the introduction of pollution emissions from productive activities.
7 Conclusion
Recent advances in the strategic delegation literature emphasize that factor market im-
perfections reduce the incentive business owners have to manipulate the structure of in-
centives embedded in managerial compensation contracts so as to encourage managers to
deviate from prot maximization. The purpose of this paper was to re-examine this issue
by allowing for pollution emissions and related environmental tax payments.
Two scenarios were considered depending on whether the upstream monopolist supplies
the intermediate product through xed price contracts or relies on a exible pricing
scheme. The corresponding two games were solved by backward induction. In both
cases, we proved the existence of a unique Subgame-Perfect Nash-Equilibrium (SPNE).
Furthermore, we showed that the value of the equilibrium prot weight is restricted to
the range from 0 to 1. It was shown that equilibrium managerial incentives encourage
pure prot maximization only in limit cases. Hence, non-prot managerial incentives are
expected to be the norm rather than the exception. Furthermore, except in limit cases,
the following results hold. A price precommitment results in a lower input price which en-
courages greater production of the nal good and greater pollution emissions. Moreover,
it makes the upstream supplier better o and downstream rms worse o. We conclude
that upstream suppliers will choose to sign xed price contracts with their customers.
This paper has limitations. For tractability reason, we assumed identical rms. Relaxing
this assumption oers interesting challenges for future research. Furthermore, our analysis
has focused exclusively on how precommitment alters managerial incentives in downstream
market. Accordingly, the rate of environmental taxation was regarded as exogenous and
the welfare consequences of precommitment were not investigated. Future research could
examine the normative question of optimal environmental policy.
A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Equation (14)
Recall that Firm i's equilibrium output level is
y⋆i =
(a+A(k,τ,ε)(
∑n
i=1 αi−(n+1)αi))
(n+1)b , (38)
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whereas that of Firm j (j ̸= i) is
y⋆j =
(a+A(k,τ,ε)(
∑n
i=1 αi−(n+1)αj))
(n+1)b . (39)
Dierentiating Equations (38) and (39) yields :
∂y⋆i /∂αi=
A(1−(n+1))
(n+1)b = − nA(n+1)b , (40)
∂y⋆j /∂αi=
A
(n+1)b , (41)
and ∑
j ̸=i
∂yj
∂αi
= (n−1)A(n+1)b . (42)
Finally, we obtain :
∂Y
∂αi
=
∑n
j=1
∂yj
∂αi
=
∑
j ̸=i
∂yj
∂αi
+ ∂yi∂αi , (43)
= ((n−1)A−nA)(n+1)b = − A(n+1)b . (44)
A.2 Proof of Equation (31)
Let us consider the rst-order conditions for prot maximization which are given by :
−
(
b ∂Y∂αi +
1
ε
∂k
∂αi
)
+ ∂yi∂αi (P (Y )−A) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (45)
From Equation (7), observe that
yi =
a−αiA
b − Y, (46)
so that
∂yi
∂αi
= −
[
1
b
(
A+ αiε
∂k
∂αi
)
+ ∂Y∂αi
]
. (47)
Plugging yi and ∂yi/∂αi back into (45), results in[
b ∂Y∂αi +
∂Ai
∂αi
] (
a−αiA
b − Y
)
+
(
1
b
(
A+ αiε
∂k
∂αi
)
+ ∂Y∂αi
)
(P (Y )−A) = 0. (48)
Given that
b
(
a−αiA
b − Y
)
= P (Y )− αiA, (49)
we obtain :
1
b
(
b ∂Y∂αi +
∂A
∂αi
) (
b
(
a−αiA
b − Y
))
+ 1b
((
A+ αiε
∂k
∂αi
)
+ b ∂Y∂αi
)
(P (Y )−A) = 0, (50)
and, nally,(
b ∂Y∂αi +
1
ε
∂k
∂αi
)
(P (Y )− αiA) +
((
A+ αiε
∂k
∂αi
)
+ b ∂Y∂αi
)
(P (Y )−A) = 0. (51)
Dierentiating Equation (9) and (10) with respect to αi yields
∂Y
∂αi
= − 1b(n+1)
[
A+
∑
i
αi
ϵ
∂k
∂αi
]
, (52)
∂yi
∂αi
= − 1(n+1)b
(
nA+ (n+ 1)
(
αi
ε
∂k
∂αi
)
−∑ni=1 αiε ∂k∂αi). (53)
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Plugging the following quantities
Y |sym= n(a−αA)b(n+1) , yi|sym= (a−αA)b(n+1) , k|sym= aε−τ(1−ε)α2α , (54)
∂Y
∂αi
∣∣∣
sym
= − (a−αA)b(n+1) , ∂yi∂αi
∣∣∣
sym
= − (na+αA)b(n+1) , ∂k∂αi
∣∣∣
sym
= − aε
2nα2
. (55)
into (
b∂Y∂α +
1
ε
∂k
∂α
)
(P (Y )− αA) + ((A+ αε ∂k∂α)+ b∂Y∂α ) (P (Y )−A) = 0, (56)
yields the cubic equation (31).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us consider the existence problem rst. Let δ0 = ω
2
2 − 3ω3ω1 and δ1 = 2ω32 −
9ω3ω2ω1+27ω
2
3ω0. The discriminant of the third-degree polynomial g(α) can be expressed
as ∆ = − (δ21 − 4δ30) / (27ω23). Let us show that ∆ < 0 so that Equation (31) has a unique
real solution αf . To this end, it is convenient to express the discriminant as ∆ = η Γ where
η = −4a2n(n+ 1)τ2(ϵ− 1)2ϵ2 < 0 and (57)
Γ = β0 + β1z + β2z
2 + β3z
3 + β4z
4 with z = (ε− 1) < 0 and (58)
β0 = a
4
(
n2 + n− 2)2 ((n− 1)n(n+ 2)2 − 2) ϵ4, (59)
β1 = −2a3(n(n(n(n(n(n(3n(n+ 2)− 5) + 5) + 19)− 31)− 29) + 16) + 12)τϵ3, (60)
β2 = a
2(n+ 1)(n(n(n(n(n(n(11n− 14) + 31)− 26) + 13) + 64)− 16)− 24)τ2ϵ2, (61)
β3 = −2a(n+ 1)2
(
2n2 − 1) (n2(n(2n− 3) + 2)− 4) τ3ϵ, (62)
β4 = n
3(n+ 1)3
(
2n2 − 1) τ4. (63)
Examining Equations (59-63), we nd that βj is positive (resp., negative) if j is even
(resp., odd), for all j = 0, . . . , 4. Since z < 0, it follows that Γ > 0 and thus ∆ < 0.
We proceed by showing that αf takes values on the interval (0, 1]. Since g(0) = ω0 > 0,
it follows that αf cannot be equal to zero. Moreover, when τa+τ < ε ≤ 1 we nd that
g(1) =
3∑
i=0
ωi = −(aε− τ (1− ε)) (a (n− 2) (n+ 1)ε+ (n− 1)(1− ε)nτ) < 0. (64)
It follows that g(α) has a sign change on the interval (0, 1). Finally, if ε = τ/(a+ τ) recall
that (aε − τ (1− ε)) = 0, so that g(1) = 0. Hence, the unique real root αf takes values
on (0, 1].
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
1. We proved that g(α) has a sign change on the interval (0, 1). Observe that g(α) > 0
implies that α < αf . It follows that αc < αf if g(αc) > 0. Then, the proof reduces to
showing that g (αc) > 0.
Straightforward computations yield g(αc) = Φh(t) where Φ = 2aε(aε−τ(1−ε))
(n2+1)2(aε+τ(1−ε))3 > 0 and
h(t) = h0 + h1τ + h2τ
2 + h3τ
3, with
h0 =a
3ε3(n+ 1)
(
n2 + 1
) (
n2 − 2n+ 2) > 0, h1 = a2(2n+ 1)((n− 1)n+ 2)2(1− ε)ε2 > 0,
(65)
h2 =a
(
n
(
n
(
n3 + 2n+ 4
)
+ 3
)
+ 2
)
(1− ε)2ε > 0, h3 = n(n+ 1)2(1− ε)3 > 0. (66)
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Let ∆(h) denote the discriminant of h(τ). By direct computation, we nd that
∆(h) = −a6(n− 1)6n(n+ 1)2(ε− 1)6ε6Γ, where (67)
Γ =
(
8n10 − n9 + 6n8 + 59n7 − 48n6 + 156n5 + 64n4 + 28n3 + 96n2 − 68n− 64) .
(68)
Since Γ is strictly positive, it follows that ∆(h) < 0. Hence, the cubic equation h (τ) has
a unique real solution. Since
h(τ)|τ=0 = a3(n+ 1)
(
n2 + 1
) (
n2 − 2n+ 2) ε3 > 0,
and h′(t) > 0, it follows that h(τ) > 0 for all τ ∈ [0, aε1−ε ]. Then Φ>0 implies that
g (αc) > 0 so that αc < αf .
2. Since limn→∞ αc(n) = 1 and αc(n) < αf (n) ≤ 1, it follows that limn→∞ αf (n) = 1.
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